tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post6107876674180937690..comments2023-09-25T04:26:51.568-06:00Comments on The Barefoot Bum: Defining knowledge: Justified true belief?Larry Hamelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788697573946266404noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-30106903974316986372008-01-09T16:07:00.000-07:002008-01-09T16:07:00.000-07:00Ron:It seems to me that it's quite easy to analyse...<B>Ron:</B><BR/><BR/><I>It seems to me that it's quite easy to analyse yourself until you vanish up your own ass, and I feel that that's what some philosophers do when considering truth and knowledge. Maybe it's just my ignorance of some of the finer points.</I><BR/><BR/>You are indeed ignorant of the finer points of philosophy. Were you aware of them, you wouldn't bother to qualify your opinion with "seems" and "feels". :-DLarry Hamelinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08788697573946266404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-16042028304218585452008-01-09T16:03:00.000-07:002008-01-09T16:03:00.000-07:00(Note: If you want to discuss what is or isn't "ph...(Note: If you want to discuss what is or isn't "philosophy", this thread is not the place. Email me, or just wait until I post directly on the subject.)Larry Hamelinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08788697573946266404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-71112748421454134522008-01-09T15:59:00.000-07:002008-01-09T15:59:00.000-07:00Lake:Forgive me for replying to your comment out o...<B>Lake:</B><BR/><BR/>Forgive me for replying to your comment out of sequence.<BR/><BR/><I>The trouble seems to be that you want to impose an irrelevant standard of adequacy for the elucidation of these concepts.</I><BR/><BR/>I have to hand it to you, mate: only a philosopher would have the chutzpah to argue straight out that clarity was an <I>irrelevant</I> standard of adequacy.<BR/><BR/><I>...(idiosyncratic, proprietary)...</I><BR/><BR/>Yet again a philosopher complains that I'm trying to be original. If you're looking for theological reverence for philosophological dogma, you won't find it here.<BR/><BR/><I>I don't suppose for a moment that the word "love" can be defined in any very clear fashion , yet there are still reasonable (if provisional) inferences that might be drawn from uses of it, and one can spot idiosyncratic occurrences. So we can talk about how the word connects up with other parts of our language, without ever really making it clear in your (idiosyncratic, proprietary) sense.</I><BR/><BR/>The trouble is, you can do this sort of analysis without having <I>any</I> clue whatsoever as to the meaning: It would be equally applicable to the <A HREF="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maya_codices" REL="nofollow">Maya codices</A>.<BR/><BR/>But we run into exactly the same problems with "love" that we do with "knowledge". A preliminary definition-free survey can take us only so far (not very far at all). To do <I>more</I>, we do in fact need to start constructing definitions, a necessary precondition to a precise theory.<BR/><BR/>I think that almost three millennia is sufficient time to allot to such a preliminary survey.<BR/><BR/><I>How do you imagine a scientific linguist's approach would differ from a philosopher's?</I><BR/><BR/>A scientific linguist is interested in how we <I>actually</I> use language. A (good) philosopher is interested in how we can <I>better</I> use language.<BR/><BR/>That's at least how I conceive philosophy. If you have a different view of philosophy, good for you. But don't complain that I'm doing philosophy "wrong" because it doesn't conform to your views or even the views of the entire academic philosophical community, of which I am not, nor will I ever be a member.Larry Hamelinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08788697573946266404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-57013113663501387842008-01-09T11:21:00.000-07:002008-01-09T11:21:00.000-07:00I've been struggling with this for a while. I can'...I've been struggling with this for a while. I can't really get a handle on knowledge with regard to truth or justification. My mind tends to work in the concrete rather than the abstract, so maybe that's why. <BR/><BR/>So, what I can get a handle on, or at least I feel I can, is information (e.g. Shannon). Information is merely laid down in the brain, using the physicalist view, in patterns that vary according to person, time, current brain state, etc., acquired through the combination of genetics, development and sensory input and so on. <BR/><BR/>Sticking with the physicalist view that consciousness is a manifestation of brain activity that gives an appearance of the 'mind', then the processes of the mind consist of the manipulation and regurgitation of an individual brain's information at any particular time - outwardly, to others, an external representation of the internal information. <BR/><BR/>So what we call individual 'knowledge' is nothing more than continuously changing pattern of transformed information. Add into the mix other brains all trying to perform the same task, each with their own internal mix of this 'knowledge', then it's no wonder we struggle to find agreement on what we understand any particular piece of knowledge to be. If there is any 'truth' out there beyond human experience then we're unlikely to acquire or agree on any 'true' interpretation of it.<BR/><BR/>Why do we want to search for a truth of any kind? Why must we agree? I don't know what the biological driving forces might be, other than it could be viewed as yet another manifestation of the consequence of housing selfish genes. But it's pretty clear we are motivated to question, to understand, and to agree on 'truths'.<BR/><BR/>In this model there is no absolute truth, at least not that we can get at. There is only knowledge as information. What we make of it and how useful it is determines whether or not it is 'justified true belief', though I've never liked that phrase (because I couldn't understand it). And I think this is how such variety in understanding can be explained; how we arrive at such a debatable position about what 'truth' is, what god is, if god exists, what morality is, etc. In some respects this is a utilitarian view, but I don't see anything wrong with that.<BR/><BR/>If this interpretation is the case then it also explains in some way the success of science and its methods and why we find them useful: the use of repeatability to establish knowledge as a consistent set of information over time, space and environment; the use of logic to establish what we can conclude or at least what we can use as a working model. Science even goes to great lengths to iron out the noise and the vagaries of human fallibility by using double blind tests and performing statistical analysis on the data to make sure, as much as we can, that the results actually represent useful knowledge/information. In other words science helps us to get as good an agreement on any 'truth' as we can reasonably expect.<BR/><BR/>Beyond this view of knowledge I struggle with much of the philosophical contemplation of it. It seems to me that it's quite easy to analyse yourself until you vanish up your own ass, and I feel that that's what some philosophers do when considering truth and knowledge. Maybe it's just my ignorance of some of the finer points.Anonymoushttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11039815765507965606noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-14500985766001323652008-01-09T08:36:00.000-07:002008-01-09T08:36:00.000-07:00Clarity in your sense is not a necessary condition...Clarity in your sense is not a necessary condition for correctness. To pick a corny example, I don't suppose for a moment that the word "love" can be defined in any very clear fashion, yet there are still reasonable (if provisional) inferences that might be drawn from uses of it, and one can spot idiosyncratic occurrences. So we can talk about how the word connects up with other parts of our language, without ever really making it clear in your (idiosyncratic, proprietary) sense.<BR/><BR/>The trouble seems to be that you want to impose an irrelevant standard of adequacy for the elucidation of these concepts. Then, when the proffered definitions fall short, your solution is to suggest talking about something else - something which <I>can</I>pass your tests. But that's just to change the subject. The concept we are interested in is the one we use.<BR/><BR/>How do you imagine a scientific linguist's approach would differ from a philosopher's? Come to that, what's a "scientific linguist", as distinct from any other sort?<BR/><BR/>And I'd love to hear an operational account of the difference between "complex, abstract intuitions" on the one hand, and "no-bullshit" ones on the other. Is there a threshold, perhaps?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-57653353760183738532008-01-09T07:55:00.000-07:002008-01-09T07:55:00.000-07:00Also, I'm not saying that a definition shouldn't b...Also, I'm not saying that a definition shouldn't be correct: I'm saying it doesn't have to be <I>obviously</I> or intuitively correct.Larry Hamelinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08788697573946266404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-14343404802523475632008-01-09T07:18:00.000-07:002008-01-09T07:18:00.000-07:00How can we tell if an unclear definition is correc...How can we tell if an unclear definition is correct? Clarity is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for correctness.<BR/><BR/><I>[I]f you wanted to explain how the meaning of the English word "knowledge" relates logically to other ordinary-language concepts (which of course it does)...</I><BR/><BR/>Then you'd be wanting to do scientific linguistics, not philosophy.<BR/><BR/><I>to what could one possibly appeal when trying to figure out how one's own language fits together, besides one's intuitions?</I><BR/><BR/>I argue against appeal to <I>complex, abstract</I> intuitions. (Unless, of course, one is doing scientific psychology or sociology.)Larry Hamelinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08788697573946266404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-22497154085484586452008-01-09T05:40:00.000-07:002008-01-09T05:40:00.000-07:00So it's more important that a definition be clear ...So it's more important that a definition be clear than that it be correct? A concocted, precise definition might be useful for some purposes. But it wouldn't be any good if you wanted to explain how the meaning of the English word "knowledge" relates logically to other ordinary-language concepts (which of course it does). And while you may want to ditch ordinary language in favour of something clearer, I don't think you'll get many followers. Which is why there is something to be said for trying to understand English.<BR/><BR/>Incidentally, to what could one possibly appeal when trying to figure out how one's own language fits together, besides one's intuitions?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com