tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post4808593481278517077..comments2023-09-25T04:26:51.568-06:00Comments on The Barefoot Bum: SteveG on Ethical SubjectivismLarry Hamelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788697573946266404noreply@blogger.comBlogger12125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-904068440054151142007-03-07T17:19:00.000-07:002007-03-07T17:19:00.000-07:00It should be noted regarding (ES) that, given the ...It should be noted regarding (ES) that, given the general goal-directed nature of human minds, <A HREF="http://barefootbum.blogspot.com/2007/02/psychological-egoism.html" REL="nofollow">people <I>will in fact</I> do that which they choose to do</A>.<BR/><BR/>But that's a purely <I>descriptive</I> statement, not a normative, ethical or even meta-ethical statement.Larry Hamelinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08788697573946266404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-83658466349789392732007-03-07T17:11:00.000-07:002007-03-07T17:11:00.000-07:00First of all, the terminology in philosophy is not...First of all, the terminology in philosophy is not as rigorous and well-defined as some professors of philosophy might have you believe. Even where it is relatively well-defined, it's been my experience that these definitions seem as if they were made to <I>maximize</I> confusion.<BR/><BR/>It is neither my desire nor intention to regularize philosophical terminology. I speak usually in ordinary dictionary English; where I find the need for specific jargon, I explicitly define it.<BR/><BR/><I>Metaethics asks several questions...</I><BR/><BR/>People <I>talking</I> about meta-ethics have asked several questions, some of them sensible, some of them stupid. I'm using meta-ethics in terms of any discussion about ethical statements, in accordance with the dictionary definition of "meta-" as "A prefix meaning one level of description higher."<BR/><BR/><I>metaphysical: Are there genuinely moral properties in the world which are constitutive of things in the same way the properties ascribed by, say, physics are?</I><BR/><BR/>First of all, "metaphysics" by itself is not used consistently in philosophical literature. It's often used confusingly (as you do here) as a synonym for "ontology".<BR/><BR/>I make very plain assertions about ontology of moral properties: They are exclusively properties of minds.<BR/><BR/><I>epistemological: Can we ever have knowledge, or justified belief, about what is good or is valuable?</I><BR/><BR/>Yes, in the exact same manner as we know any of our own and others' mental states.<BR/><BR/><I>semantic: Do assertions pertaining to moral matters express propositions, or are they emotive expletives, or are they sui generis speech acts like commands?</I><BR/><BR/>To the extent that specific ethical sentences directly or indirectly reference mental states, they are propositional. To the extent that they do not, they are metaphorical or in error.<BR/><BR/><I>What is moral discourse about, if anything?</I><BR/><BR/>Usually <A HREF="http://barefootbum.blogspot.com/2007/01/propaganda-and-negotiation.html" REL="nofollow">Propaganda and Negotation</A><BR/><BR/><I>(ES) An agent b has an obligation to perform act A if and only if agent b bears an appropriate attitude (e.g. approval) towards the proposition that agent b performs act A.</I><BR/><BR/>This statement is, like every other expression of Ethical Subjectivism, logically incoherent. It asks, "Is it good to do that which you think is good to do?" It is conflating an ethical question with a meta-ethical question.<BR/><BR/>While forming self-referential paradoxes strange loops, and hiding the self-referentiality in as much obscure jargon and pseudo algebra seems like a time-honored philosophical game, it is not the sort of philosophy I'm particularly interested in.<BR/><BR/><I>The expression 'is true' is a monadic predicate which applies to a proposition when it is true simpliciter...</I><BR/><BR/>This is a very limited way of looking at "true": Statements expressing relations (San Francisco is ~3,000 miles from New York) can propositional and can be true in the ordinary, prosiac sense of "true". The distinction you draw is confusing without adding any additional rigor.<BR/><BR/><I>(ST) The truth of a moral proposition is always indexed to an appropriate mental state of an agent.<BR/><BR/>This would be a genuinely metaethical position on the semantics of ethical discourse.</I><BR/><BR/>I say <A HREF="http://barefootbum.blogspot.com/2007/02/meta-ethical-subjective-relativism-part.html" REL="nofollow">explicitly:</A><BR/><BR/><B>Statements about ethics have an absolute truth-value if and only if they are stated relative to some subjective entity or property.</B><BR/><BR/><I>Why think the phrase 'is true' has two different meanings in different domains of discourse?</I><BR/><BR/>It's you, not me, who's trying to create multiple meanings of "true" and/or trying to deny the propositional content of relationship sentences.Larry Hamelinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08788697573946266404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-11010081710491827862007-03-07T15:51:00.000-07:002007-03-07T15:51:00.000-07:00Some terminological comments. It is not clear to m...Some terminological comments. <BR/><BR/>It is not clear to me that the view you have espoused as "Meta-Ethical Subjective Relativism" is really a metaethical viewpoint. Metaethics asks several questions, the main ones being:<BR/><BR/><I>metaphysical</I>: Are there genuinely moral properties in the world which are constitutive of things in the same way the properties ascribed by, say, physics are?<BR/><BR/><I>epistemological</I>: Can we ever have knowledge, or justified belief, about what is good or is valuable?<BR/><BR/><I>semantic</I>: Do assertions pertaining to moral matters express propositions, or are they emotive expletives, or are they <I>sui generis</I> speech acts like commands? What is moral discourse <I>about</I>, if anything?<BR/><BR/>There are two ways one might understand your position (perhaps you'll clarify).<BR/><BR/>Let Ethical Subjectivism <B>(ES)</B> be the thesis:<BR/><BR/><B>(ES)</B> An agent <I>b</I> has an obligation to perform act <I>A</I> if and only if agent <I>b</I> bears an appropriate attitude (e.g. approval) towards the proposition that agent <I>b</I> performs act <I>A</I>.<BR/><BR/>This thesis <B>(ES)</B> belongs to <I>normative</I> ethics, since it circumscribes particular duties that an agent might have. This position is meta-ethically neutral -- a realist about moral properties can hold <B>(ES)</B>! (This may be closer to what Steve G was really talking about.)<BR/><BR/>The expression 'is true' is a monadic predicate which applies to a proposition when it is true <I>simpliciter</I>. Perhaps you mean to advance the thesis that moral truth is a two-place <I>relation</I> between a proposition and an agent that proposition is true <I>for</I>, leaving open the possibility that a proposition might be morally true for one agent and not for another. This thesis we might call the Subjectivity of moral Truth thesis <B>(ST)</B>:<BR/><BR/><B>(ST)</B> The truth of a moral proposition is always indexed to an appropriate mental state of an agent.<BR/><BR/>This would be a genuinely metaethical position on the semantics of ethical discourse. <BR/><BR/>So far you haven't provided any linguistic evidence that this is the way it is. Why think the phrase 'is true' has two different <I>meanings</I> in different domains of discourse? To be sure, <I>prima facie</I> the phrase 'is true' means the same thing in moral discourse as ordinary, fact-stating discourse. So, I am not sure why we should not take this at face value.<BR/><BR/>Perhaps you can set the record straight.Timmohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04095596090336782085noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-56026854670443565182007-03-07T14:11:00.000-07:002007-03-07T14:11:00.000-07:00James,That's an excellent point. What convinces us...James,<BR/><BR/>That's an excellent point. What convinces us of an objective reality with regard to perception is (near) universal assent to <I>occasion</I> sentences; the moral statements that obtain universal assent are all <I>standing</I> sentences.Larry Hamelinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08788697573946266404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-52237166887910766732007-03-07T14:01:00.000-07:002007-03-07T14:01:00.000-07:00Perhaps the demarcation is this: Are moral "truths...Perhaps the demarcation is this: Are moral "truths" objective facts or simply "universally" agreed upon? I suspect the latter.James F. Elliotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16747033407956667363noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-73736582082355100492007-03-07T09:11:00.000-07:002007-03-07T09:11:00.000-07:00Well, I'm not certain what my comments look like, ...Well, I'm not certain what my comments <I>look like</I>, but I know my own intent pretty well, which is not to say that the whole of ethics is meta-ethics.<BR/><BR/>The intent of meta-ethics is to discuss what kind of ethical theories <I>can be</I> true (or false). SteveG's essay is also meta-ethical: It doesn't talk about what <I>is</I> true, it talks about what can be true.<BR/><BR/>Steve and I probably agree close to 100% about what we think is good: I suspect that we have almost identical ethical content. Where we appear to disagree sharply is how to discuss, interpret, contextualize and substantiate our ethical beliefs: all of these are <I>meta-</I>ethical issues.Larry Hamelinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08788697573946266404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-17695405795201606792007-03-07T08:16:00.000-07:002007-03-07T08:16:00.000-07:00It does look like you are saying the whole of ethi...It does look like you are saying the whole of ethics is metaethics. Can that be right?toby lewishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15687485829494173937noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-60548177768413753472007-03-07T05:32:00.000-07:002007-03-07T05:32:00.000-07:00Toby Lewis:There are indeed no small few moral wri...<B>Toby Lewis</B>:<BR/><BR/>There are indeed no small few moral writings that are propagandistic (in a good way) in that they attempt to change our existing beliefs about what is good.<BR/><BR/>I think, though, that <I>theory</I> really does have to apply to what <I>is</I> in some sense. Moral propaganda is not theoretical in nature. Which is ok; not everything has to be a theory.<BR/><BR/>However, there's a lot of propaganda that <I>looks like</I> theory, which is in my view bullshit. I'm against bullshit in principle, even if its well-meaning.<BR/><BR/>It was explicitly my intent to relate specifically <I>ethical</I> theory (and not meta-ethics) to psychological theory. I may be wrong (and if so, I'll take my lumps), but I'm not going to retreat to meta-ethics on this point.Larry Hamelinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08788697573946266404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-80697607155587124962007-03-07T05:13:00.000-07:002007-03-07T05:13:00.000-07:00I have to disagree with this: "In essence, ethical...I have to disagree with this: "In essence, ethical theories are very much like psychological theories: They explain how we do think, not how we should think."<BR/><BR/>There is obviously a degree of moral phenomenology in ethics but it is also about putting forward positions that might hold sway. Ethical revolutions take place the whole time, although unlike parallel scientific revolutions there is no objective fact about what is moral feeding the belief and far more regression. Instead it is the result of dialogue between people which is where the psychological element comes in. Yet unlike a theory of consciousness morality has no roots in what actually is, morality is a huge collection of thoughts people have had over time which they have tried to convince others should be the case. <BR/><BR/>If you used the term meta-ethical instead of ethical inside your argument, I think it would go through.toby lewishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15687485829494173937noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-736728409008884252007-03-06T12:57:00.000-07:002007-03-06T12:57:00.000-07:00Also, to be fair to Steve, I think his comments ar...Also, to be fair to Steve, I think his comments are pretty standard stuff; I see this argument--and the trivially fallacious arguments he criticizes--fairly often in what little of the professional literature I read as well as the derivative popularizations.<BR/><BR/>I view the situation more in terms of the classical physicists in the early 20th century, having such deep intuitions about classical physics that relativity and quantum mechanics just didn't seem to make sense at a deep level.<BR/><BR/>I don't think my views on meta-ethical subjective relativism (which are probably just restatements of better philosophers than me; there is little actually new in philosophy) will ever achieve currency, much less currency in my own lifetime.Larry Hamelinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08788697573946266404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-75402006438735287682007-03-06T12:51:00.000-07:002007-03-06T12:51:00.000-07:00We can certainly create explanatory theories on th...We can certainly create explanatory theories on the basis of subjective ethics: "So and so premises explain the moral beliefs of these particular people."<BR/><BR/>In other words, specific ethical theories can be evidentiary, but they are still subjective in the sense of depending completely on subjective facts with no objective content.<BR/><BR/>In essence, ethical theories are very much like psychological theories: They explain how we <I>do</I> think, not how we <I>should</I> think.Larry Hamelinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08788697573946266404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-84143442018589750062007-03-06T12:46:00.000-07:002007-03-06T12:46:00.000-07:00Steve G's post was surprisingly bush league. The "...Steve G's post was surprisingly bush league. The "ice cream" analogy is old and flawed. I've always found the dichotomy he presents -- that one cannot judge others if "tolerance is the only virtue" -- to be false.<BR/><BR/>I think, in the end, we have people arguing on different levels. Ethical subjectivists, as Steve characterizes them, seem much more concerned -- as Larry demonstrates -- with meta-ethics, the how and why we arrive at our conclusions. Moral absolutists (or moral realists, for the more polite and honest ones) tend to be arguing about end-results, the moral conclusions. But then both act like they're discussing the same thing, when really they're at cross-purposes.<BR/><BR/>I view "moral truths" in a similar way to scientific facts and theories like relativity: Sometimes an idea is just so good, so suited to man's needs, that one continually arrives at it; in the same way, a scientific theory matches the evidence and explains the observed cause and effect interactions better than alternate explanations. It's an inaccurate analogy, of end-result to process, again, and it needs fleshing out, but it works.James F. Elliotthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16747033407956667363noreply@blogger.com