tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post867473973349517108..comments2023-09-25T04:26:51.568-06:00Comments on The Barefoot Bum: Process ReliabilismLarry Hamelinhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08788697573946266404noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-55934435116642835422008-02-17T11:42:00.000-07:002008-02-17T11:42:00.000-07:00[I]sn't the problem with Timmo's argument just the...<I>[I]sn't the problem with Timmo's argument just the same old, "How do I really know I'm not a brain in a vat..."</I><BR/><BR/>I'm not sure that this is a problem with specifically <I>Timmo's</I> argument. The brain in the vat problem applies to <I>all</I> forms of axiomatic foundationalism; it's a problem in philosophical epistemology in general.<BR/><BR/>The problem with Timmo's argument is that it doesn't really solve anything. It just moves our confusion about "justification" to confusion about "reliable belief" (or, if you move Timmo's hyphen, to confusion about "true belief" and "reliable process).<BR/><BR/>The intent of such a maneuver is to exempt belief-formation processes from criticism: It might be the case that a belief-formation process is reliable, and thus beliefs formed by that process justified, without actually being able to <I>prove</I> that the process is reliable. You have to have, dontcha know, a reliable belief-formation process to form reliable beliefs about belief-formation processes.<BR/><BR/>If the circularity and self-referentiality above makes your brain hurt, you're in good company.<BR/><BR/>There's no way to break the deadlock except by Pragmatism... a Pragmatism that goes considerably beyond Pierce, James and Dewey's formulations. (In much the same way we have to go considerably beyond Popper's formulation of falsifiability to get a working theory of scientific epistemology.)Larry Hamelinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08788697573946266404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-28755195.post-28899633702001771022008-02-17T11:19:00.000-07:002008-02-17T11:19:00.000-07:00I'm no philostomopher, but isn't the problem with ...I'm no philostomopher, but isn't the problem with Timmo's argument just the same old, "How do I really know I'm not a brain in a vat in the lab of some evil scientist who has all my nerves hooked up to a computer that is delivering appropriate signals to make it seem like I live in a world"? At the end of the day, there is no satisfying response to that concern, right?Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com