A (good) philosopher is interested in how we can better use language.This is obviously an outrageous comment, and deserves explanation.
That's at least how I conceive philosophy. If you have a different view of philosophy, good for you. But don't complain that I'm doing philosophy "wrong" because it doesn't conform to your views or even the views of the entire academic philosophical community, of which I am not, nor will I ever be a member.
"It's all very clever, Larry," a critic might say, "but is it philosophy?" It might not be good philosophy — each reader will have to judge the quality independently — but I say it is philosophy.
Now, if the entire academic scientific community said I was doing science wrong, I would at least take such criticism seriously. Scientists get to strongly "brand" their work for a number of reasons. Science means something, a meaning discernible independently of what scientists say: the definition of science is affirmed, not established, by the opinion of scientists. The definition of science is very specific. The definition of science is entirely methodological; there are no conclusions established as scientific by definition. (Of course, no small few conclusions are well-established by scientific methodology, but that's a horse of a different color.) And we must credit science and scientists (along with a lot of other people) for building our modern technological society. That value buys them quite a lot of confidence.
Philosophy, on the other hand, is all over the place: Spinoza to Derrida, Nietzsche to Hegel, Hume to Kierkegaard. Many works of pure fiction seem to have substantial philosophical content. Philosophy might be able to exclude My Little Pony, but little else.
Philosophy is resistant to any explicit definition: If philosophy is defined to be thus-and-such, then whether that definition is correct (or even meaningful) becomes an obvious topic for philosophical inquiry.
To the extent that there is are informal methodological criteria for philosophy, I assert I'm meeting those criteria: I'm considering the "big" questions: What is knowledge? What is good? What is true? I employ actual logic, and I pay attention to criticism of how well I do so. And I can hardly be faulted for appealing to intuition. I'm a terrible philosophologer — I'm not nearly as intimately familiar with the philosophical canon as someone with a PhD in philosophy — but neither am I entirely ignorant of prior work. And the philosophical canon is chock full of works that have little or no philosophological content.
Those who seem most keen on simply dismissing my work as unphilosophical seem to do so to protect particular conclusions, most recently my rejection of "justified true belief" as a definition of knowledge: asserting it is "irrelevant" (i.e. unphilosophical) that I find this definition fatally unclear. Dismissing a work on the basis of its conclusions, though, just establishes dogma; as an atheist, I object to dogma in any form, theological or philosophical.
Philosophy is fundamentally a pluralistic endeavor. I consider the objection, made explicitly or implicitly, that I'm not doing philosophy to be a non-starter.