Showing posts sorted by relevance for query Kenneth. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query Kenneth. Sort by date Show all posts

Friday, June 29, 2007

Po' baby

Kenneth at Time Immortal demands an apology for putting words in his mouth and assorted snarkiness. I've refused to apologize, so until I hear one way or the other, I'll post my response, rather than comment on his blog.

Does anyone here (other than Kenneth) interpret the sentence,
Kenneth denies the charge of rococo metaphysics: They're not "rococo" he says, just elaborate, multi-layered, arbitrary and entirely unnecessary. Oops, my bad.
as me saying that Kenneth literally says that religious metaphysics are arbitrary and entirely unnecessary? Or is it clear from context and the lack of quotation marks that I'm drawing a conclusion about his essay? If I'm wrong or misleading, I'll apologize, but I don't think I'm wrong.

Kenneth charges that
Barefoot seems to have completely abandoned [his original essay] from consideration, which I can not count as a credit to him.
This charge is more or less accurate; the discussion has wandered a bit afield. I can plead only limited time to respond to an enormous post with many points. Kenneth—if he chooses to continue the conversation—is free to pull me back to the original essay.

Kenneth says he "cannot count on him to indulge any of my methodologies with a similarly open mind." In what way am I not being open-minded? I'm willing to read and respond to his arguments as written, but open-mindedness does not entail uncritical acceptance.

I have to freely admit that
Notably absent in Barefoot’s own posting, though, is any substantiative, consensus-driven, non-abritrary “meat” of the argument. When he’s not mocking me he’s…not…saying much else, really.
I have to plead only that Kenneth did not offer much of substance. Keep in mind that my criticism is not that one cannot form a principled consensus about religion, it's that the principles required are rococo, in the sense that they are over-elaborate and ornamental. So rococo, in fact, that there is such disagreement in the principles necessary to even begin a discussion of God that the inability to reach a consensus is pushed to the choice of principles.

I skip over a one ore two of his "principles" in my first response, so let me make as complete a list as I can:
  1. Choice of scripture: nothing
  2. Choice of canon: "religious fervor" (good) vs. politics (bad)
  3. Masoretic vs. Septuagint: New Testament quotation (good) vs. original language (bad)
  4. Literal vs. metaphor: whatever fits one's theological preconceptions using the “Message-Incident Principle”
  5. Overall: coherence: "truth cannot contradict truth"
All of these principles, except the last are completely arbitrary, and two of them (religious fervor, and the "Message-Incident Principle") are completely subjective. Not only that, but most of these principles are fairly complex (especially the "Message-Incident Principle"), hiding even more rococo ornamentation.

More importantly, all of these principles except coherence are completely unnecessary. There is nothing that stands in need of explanation that demands we adopt them. There is simply no justification to seek reasons or principles in the first place to buttress the specifically scriptural character of any text. Rather, these reasons are all post hoc rationalizations: One first accepts the scriptural character of some text and then chooses the principles which support that preconception. No logical contradiction or false-to-fact conclusion can be reached by adopting the inverse of these principles, different principles, or just rejecting scriptural character altogether.

Even coherence is honored by the religious more in the breach than the observance. If some "theologically necessary" event is required to be literally true but contradicts established science, one simply invokes a miracle. If one can invoke miracles to cover any contradiction with science and fact, one can justify anything; hardly conducive to generating principled consensus.

In his subsequent response, Kenneth offers a few clarifications. He mentions that "Luther’s rejection of the expanded canon of the Septuagint was for purely political reasons, as opposed to having some reasoning grounded in religious faith or spiritual inspiration." First of all, how does he know Luther's reasons were purely political? Second, he accuses Luther of adjusting the canon to fit his preconceived theology and politics, but that's exactly what Kenneth himself does: He just adds another rococo layer of picking the principles that justifies the text that supports his preconceived theology. Last, in what way can reasoning be "grounded in religious faith or spiritual inspiration?" Kenneth offers no explanation.

Kenneth charges that I draw an all-or-nothing false dichotomy between literalism and metaphor:
Barefoot to be a little more…open to the idea that there are more ways to interpret Scripture than just assuming that it’s either all meant to be taken literally or not meant to be taken literally at all.
This is an egregious misrepresentation. I'm not saying it has to be one way or another (although the thoughtful person wonders why an omnipotent God would ever utter words that are not only literally untrue but ludicrously so) but rather I'm asking how does one choose for any specific passage? I don't insist on an all-or-nothing answer, but just saying only that one chooses a "combination of both" on the purely subjective "Message-Incident Principle" is not much of a principle.

Let me take a brief detour into the Message-Incident Principle:
[S]eparate the message of a body of Scripture from the incidents described within the raw text; if the message is such that the events in the text are required to be literal (for example: Christ’s death and resurrection) in order that both be true, then the text should be interpreted as such until a fundamental conflict between sources occurs. If, on the other hand, the message can be true even if the events in the text, if interpreted as literal, cannot be reconciled to other evidence at hand (for example: the order and duration of Creation in Genesis), then the text should be interpreted as metaphorical (i.e. as a way the Spirit communicates to humanity that God is the Creator without the need for complex explanations of stellar physics and biological processes).
In other words:
  1. If the text fits your preconceived notions and doesn't get you laughed at, it's literally true
  2. If you can't swallow the text, arbitrarily choose a metaphor to read into it
  3. If you have to swallow the text anyway, invoke a miracle to choke it down
This is what passes for "principle" in religious "reasoning".

Kenneth acknowledges that there can be multiple "messages" in a text, but calls this observation a "semantic quibble". But this observation is directly on point: How do you reach a principled consensus on which message or messages to adopt as true? Remember, these are messages that in some way contradict the literal meaning of the text, which has been abandoned by the principle. He then yet again confuses rococo with validity:
But even if a particular passage of text can have multiple messages that we might derive from it, does that render our method invalid?
You can make anything valid: Validity is formal, not alethic. This is my whole point: that religious belief is a rococo post hoc rationalization to make outrageous and ridiculous notions "valid", as if this sort of validity had any value whatsoever.

Kenneth does not seem to understand "principled consensus", making an inapt comparison to scientific fraud:
One could be dishonest in using the Message-Incident principle, twisting the “message” of the text to suit whatever particular end one wants. But then, a scientist can distort his results to fit a pre-determined conclusion.
The difference is that we can detect a scientist's distortion by appealing to the parsimonious principles of the scientific method. How do we detect in a principled manner whether one is being "dishonest" in using the Message-Incident principle? How do we know in a principled manner whether or not one is tendentiously "twisting" the message? Just calling something a principle doesn't make it one. Kenneth again doesn't answer.

Kenneth is an intelligent guy: I chose his ideas to examine precisely because he's not just a "God said, I believe it" idiot. But, bottom line, I argue that religion is nothing more than rationalized self-delusion, and if that position troubles him, too bad. I don't assume that religion is just "making shit up and calling it true", that's a conclusion that I've draw from years of study. I may be wrong, and Kenneth (or anyone else) is free to argue the point, and I'll examine the arguments as written. But I'm not going to swallow a line of bullshit just to show my "respect".

Thursday, June 28, 2007

Rococo metaphysics

I mentioned in my previous essay that
[I]f you accept a scripture and some extremely elaborate and rococo interpretive system, you can generate principled agreement, but the obvious flaw in this method is the choice of scripture and interpretive schema (exegesis). ... And once you've chosen a scripture, how do you interpret it?
Kenneth denies the charge of rococo metaphysics: They're not "rococo" he says, just elaborate, multi-layered, arbitrary and entirely unnecessary. Oops, my bad. [Update: I apologize for being unclear here. Kenneth admits to multi-layered; my conclusion is that his supposed principles are arbitrary and unnecessary.]

Keep in mind that I reference Kenneth because he's the most intelligent, literate, philosophically astute theist I've come across in many a year. What's even better is that he doesn't retreat immediately to weaselry.

As I mentioned in my earlier essay, the choice of scripture is critically important, because choosing a scripture brings in a whole book's worth of (depending on how you look at it) metaphysical assumptions or the totality of your authoritative evidence. Kenneth addresses this important choice by... completely ignoring it.
The first step, then, in religious epistemology is to isolate and consider only one religion at a time, at least at first. ... Which one is considered is not so important at this point, although it will become more relevant in a while.
Apparently "a while" exceeds the considerably time necessary to read his whole essay; he does not return to the question. Nor, of course, does he address the question of why we should accept any text as scriptural.

Kenneth then details the rococo elaborate and multi-layered arbitrary assumptions that constitute religious "epistemology". He substitutes verbiage for actual substantiation or argumentation, so I'll condense.

He addresses first the choice of a specific canon within a family of scripture:
The first answer to determining whether a particular canon is valid is to look at its origins. A limited Old Testament canon, as the Protestants employ, is easily rejected as a valid source for serious scholarship because its limitedness is not a decision born out of religious fervor so much as it is born out of politics...
Apparently "religious fervor" is a principled epistemic method.

His historical analysis of the scriptural sources of Catholicism vs. Protestantism is completely tendentious, revealing a lack of even an amateur understanding of history. He condemns the Protestants for using politics, but completely ignores the political dimensions of the First Council of Nicaea and the history of the Catholic Chruch. Constantine I and a host of Popes running enormous empires and institution have political agenda? Perish the thought!

Kenneth gives us yet another principled epistemic layer, criticizing the Protestant adoption of the Masoretic (Hebrew) Old Testament text because it was not motivated by "any particularly holy or divinely inspired reason." Divine inspiration: That always yields consistent results!

Once we've chosen a canon by a "more reasoned, analytical method" (I guess it's more reasoned than simply spouting gibberish), we now face the problem of interpeting that scripture. "Do we approach it with strict literalism? Strict non-literalism?" Kenneth has the principled answer: "[S]ome combination of both." We can even use extra-Scriptural sources!

Kenneth asserts that coherence is some great invention of Catholicism:
Pope John Paul II expanded upon this fine start with many different writings on the relationship between faith and science, building up a profound understanding in Catholic learning that truth cannot contradict truth...
Sorry, Kenneth; Pope John Paul II was about twenty five centuries late on that one.

It's certainly true that "both Scripture and science can be fully reconciled to each other in all important matters." It's trivially easy if you look at scripture as a purely human literary endeavor. It gets a little more problematic when you start talking about things like the resurrection of the dead, virgin births, the sun standing still in the sky, and the like. We'll leave the whole issue of parsimony to another day; the question here is can you reconcile science and scripture—while still keeping the specially scriptural quality of the text—in a uniform, consensual way?

Kenneth offers us a little help here, referencing
Sir Francis Bacon’s “Two Books” philosophy and the concept called the “Message-Incident Principle” — separate the message of a body of Scripture from the incidents described within the raw text; if the message is such that the events in the text are required to be literal (for example: Christ’s death and resurrection) in order that both be true, then the text should be interpreted as such until a fundamental conflict between sources occurs. If, on the other hand, the message can be true even if the events in the text, if interpreted as literal, cannot be reconciled to other evidence at hand (for example: the order and duration of Creation in Genesis), then the text should be interpreted as metaphorical...
But this is pure double-talk. The idea that there can be a single "message" apart from the literal text (even the idea that the literal text can be univocal) ignores a century of linguistics, philology and analytic philosophy. This "principle" allows the reader to arbitrarily change the meaning of the literal text to extract a "message" from it.

Kenneth again tries to wriggle out from under the charge of "rococo metaphysics":
And again, these are not rococo methods at all, but widely accepted techniques of theological epistemology that most serious Biblical scholars employ in their analysis.
But of course wide acceptance does not mean that what is widely accepted is not rococo.

Kenneth has not actually given us any real principles, just arbitrary, subjective preferences hardly better than flipping a coin.

He does go on to compare religion not to epistemology but to art. Well, art consists pretty much of making shit up. As a metaphor for religion, I can't find much to argue there. But at least artists don't go around making shit up and then calling it true.

Sunday, June 10, 2007

I know my wife loves me

For the second time, the religious trope that, "One cannot know—in a scientific sense—that your wife loves you" has appeared. Since people do in fact believe they know their spouses love them, they must be employing a non-scientific method of acquiring this knowledge. Furthermore, since the belief is presumably more often accurate than chance would predict, this non-scientific method is demonstrably effective.

I'm having a "spirited" discussion with Kenneth, a Catholic intellectual at Time Immortal: Faith, Reason and Epistemology which grew out of my comments to George Jonas on Christopher Hitchens.

His comments on love:
[T]here are many things that most people, by and large, accept without substantiative empirical proof of their existence. Love is an easy example, because there’s no way I can actually ask a person to prove, with evidence, that they love me. I either accept it on faith that they do, or I don’t believe it. Or I say that there is no such thing as love…but why be silly?
The operative word here is "proof", and the conflation of proof with empirical[1] knowledge. We can see his focus on proof in his further comments:
[I]ndifference and hostility are not always hallmarks of a lack of love. Indeed, depending on the person, they can be brought out by stress, hormonal shifts, or worry. More to the point, many medications (prednisone comes readily to mind) can stimulate those exact attitudes in a person — I know from first-hand experience, precisely because someone I love dearly was once on the aforementioned drug, and would often fly into psychosis-induced rages at the drop of a hat.

The real confusing factor in many of the above criteria is that the shift is not sudden, and therefore easily identifiable as being the result of some untoward cause. Instead, the transformation is gradual — it very much looks and feels like the person is becoming steadily and consistently angrier and more resentful, and very much looks and feels like they are “falling out of love” with you. This was certainly my own experience with this young woman of whom I speak.

But she had not ceased to love me — indeed, we’re getting married in October! — but the point is that based on most normal categories, I could have reasoned that she had, in fact, ceased to love me. I would have been wrong in drawing that conclusion, though. The human being is a very complex creature on a number of levels, and sometimes seemingly unrelated changes or issues can produce effects that will be falsely identified as evidence of a wholly different thing.

So while such things as love can sometimes be falsified, the criteria we might use to determine its falseness are not ideal, nor particularly suited to all situations — they are not universal. And so we cannot conclude, in any sweeping sense, that love, as a concept, is completely falsifiable.
Kenneth (with considerable skill) makes four arguments here. The first is the pedestrian observation that finite evidence cannot constitute absolute proof. The second is the principled objection to scientific epistemology, that it is not possible to decide between specific hypotheses in isolation on the basis of evidence. The third is the assertion that people employ a degree of faith (in the strict sense of truth-apt belief contrary to the evidence or without sufficient evidence) . All three of these points are sound but irrelevant.

The fourth argument would be an attempt substantiate his original assertion that love is generally accepted "without substantiative empirical proof" of its existence, and such acceptance is justified. My responses to his other arguments will show that this assertion is, if not unacceptably vague, actually false.

The objections that Kenneth raises are sound, but they relate to the metaphysical interpretation of empiricism, not specifically to whether people do or do not in fact draw conclusions about love based on an empirical basis, or, to the extent that they do draw non-empirical conclusions, they are any more accurate than any other non-empirical conclusions.

Empirical conclusions are indeed not "proof" in the sense of rigorously deductive certainties. Empiricism is evidentiary, not deductive. As I elaborate in my series on The Scientific Method, a scientific theory is (ideally) a logical formal system from which one derives the evidence obtained; it is not a set of conclusions logically derived from the evidence. Empiricism instead is a rational decision-making procedure: Not which theory is proven, but which theory is better than another.

Likewise one cannot draw empirical conclusions only on the basis of agreement with evidence, especially regarding a single hypothesis in "isolation". As the Dead Parrot sketch so amusingly illustrates, one can always adjust the subsidiary hypotheses of a theoretical framework to maintain agreement with the evidence for a specific hypothesis: "He's pining for the fjords!" For this reason, we must employ additional criteria to make empiricism a rational, deterministic decision procedure.

Two additional criteria do the job: scope and parsimony. A theory that accounts for a large body of evidence compares favorably to a theory that accounts for only for a small subset of that evidence. Likewise a more compact theory, a theory with (depending on the mode of analysis) fewer irreducible premises or ontological objects compares favorably to a theory with more premises or objects. Everything else being equal, a theory with greater scope or that is more parsimonious is preferable to a theory with lesser scope or more extravagance.

Kenneth's third point, that people do in fact employ reasoning that is not scientifically rigorous regarding love, is not controversial. But this trivial fact is beside the point. Two questions drive more directly to the heart of Kenneth's point. Do people employ reasoning that bears little or no relationship with empirical reasoning? And, more importantly, to the greater or lesser extent that people employ reasoning that would draw conclusions different from rigorous scientific reason, are they justified in doing so?

We can see that we must answer "no" to both questions.

First, it is not an objection that people make real-world decisions on the basis of their perceptual reasoning. The normative value of empiricism does not depend on the establishment of absolute proof; it requires only that the chosen theory be better than the alternative. That people do in fact actually decide that others love them is not itself evidence that they are employing non-empirical reasoning.

I don't know about Kenneth, but most people I know draw conclusions about love at least in a context of perceptual evidence: The things that the other person says and does, evidence that could, in principle, be verified with a video camera and a tape recorder. People do not typically believe that someone with whom they have had no interaction at all actually loves them, and the phrase for people with a belief disconnected from perception is at best "deluded" and at worst "psycho stalker" (cough John Hinckley, Jr.).

Secondly, they are employing the evidence in a falsifiable manner. It is beside the point that a specific hypothesis cannot be falsified in isolation; the point is that the hypothesis that "my wife loves me" exists in a theoretical context: my notions about my wife's stateof mind, and love and human psychology in general. Evidence that contradicts my whole theory requires some adjustment to the theory rather than simply ignoring the evidence to the extent of actually denying the evidence. Again, we label people who simply deny the verifiable evidence of their senses as seriously mentally ill, not as exemplars of some alternative epistemology.

We can see such an adjustment in Kenneth's example above: "[D]epending on the person, [indifference and hostility] can be brought out by stress, hormonal shifts, or worry." Here we see that one must updating his theory, his model of the world, because his original simplistic theory was false-to-fact. It is that a falsifiable theory must be updated when falsified that makes the other criteria—scope and parsimony—meaningful.

How far do people adjust their subsidiary hypotheses or arbitrarily restrict the scope of their theories to save the fundamental hypothesis? Any ordinary person will observe that people do in fact go pretty far, especially ignoring parsimony. The battered wife who insists that, deep down, her husband really does love her—indeed anyone with a consistently and thoroughly indifferent or hostile spouse—is ignoring parsimony. And yet again, such people are not held up as exemplars of an alternative epistemology: We see them as deluded or just plain stupid.

Human psychology is complicated and its universals not well known; there are many alternative theories which can account for a range of behavior. But there is a point where such alternatives collapse of their own weight—the principles of parsimony and scope are operative. Contradiction of the canons of empirical reasoning—logic, falsifiability, scope and parsimony—does not intuitively appear to generate better success. Quite the contrary: we view such contradiction as delusion, mental illness or stupidity.

The fact that empirical reasoning does not supply absolute, certain proof, as well as the fact that human psychology is complicated and our understanding is limited, does raise the important question of sufficiency of knowledge: Absent absolute proof, how do we know when we have enough information to justify a decision?

To answer this question, we have to turn to probabilistic game theory. We have to judge the "plausibility" that our theory, which includes the hypothesis that "my wife loves me", is accurate or mistaken—i.e. whether all further evidence will support the theory or will later compel an alternative theory containing the hypothesis that "my wife does not love me" by virtue of scope or parsimony. In principle we have estimates of the prior plausibility (based on the reports of other people who have accurate or mistaken beliefs about love) so we can employ Bayes Theorem to good effect.

We also have to consider subjective value. Whether my wife does or does not love me is not an abstract proposition about which I am emotionally neutral, in the sense that I'm emotionally neutral about the hypothesis that "electrons, i.e. point particles with negative electrical charge and unit mass, exist". Having the accurate belief that my wife loves me entails considerable positive subjective value. Having the inaccurate belief that she loves me will entail considerable negative subjective value. (For the sake of simplicity, we will ignore the case that she does indeed love me now but might change her mind in the future.)

I don't want to get into all the ins and outs of game theory; in essence we multiply each value by the corresponding plausibility; if the results are equivocal, we search for more evidence; if one result dominates, we choose it.

All this sounds reductionist and a little cold-hearted, but it isn't really. Most of this reasoning actually happens, just not quite so explicitly. And people do in fact make decisions about love that can only be called "bad". Furthermore, the decisions we call bad are precisely those which are the least supported by empirical reasoning. Sometimes people get lucky and make good decisions for the wrong reasons, but people never make bad (in a probabilistic sense) decisions for the right reasons.

The prior probability (unconditioned by direct evidence) that someone might actually love one is high enough, and our intuitive beliefs about empiricism and psychology are usually accurate enough, that we don't have to be paranoid or formally rigorous about the decision to believe that others love us. On the other hand, there are people out there who will try to fool us, who will pretend love for the opportunity to exploit or from pure self-delusion; we're justified in exercising reasonable, moderate and sensible caution. And people are in fact often fooled, so it makes sense to examine the issue in a neutral, philosophical and scientific manner to learn how to make better decisions.


[1] I mean small-e empiricism, in the sense of connected in an unspecified way to perceptual experience, not big-E Empiricism, the (deprecated) philosophical position that experience can form a specifically axiomatic foundation for the logical deduction of universal truth.

Monday, July 02, 2007

I'm mad as hell

... and I'm not going to take it anymore.[1]

I've received some feedback about my "vitriolic" tone, which has its most severe expression in my recent essay Sir Salman Rushdie, but has also been noted regarding my writing about religion in general, most recently my essay Rococo metaphysics. I'll not deny the charge, nor make excuses, but I would like to give my readers a little of the back-story.

I came to philosophy via religion: I started discussing both religion and philosophy at the Internet Infidels Discussion Board beginning in late 1999. Before that, I'd read a little philosophy and "spiritual" stuff, but I'd not thought or read deeply on the subject. I started off very abstract and dispassionate on Infidels, using my innate skepticism and skill at logical analysis developed as a computer programmer to discuss and criticize the canonical arguments for the existence of God. I worked out most of the rebuttals on my own; they're really not that difficult.

I noticed a curious thing... well, two curious things. The more logical flaws I found in religious people's philosophical and ethical reasoning, the worse their reasoning became and the more angry and contemptuous they became. I've lost count of the times I've been damned to hell or the had dust of my words shaken off someone's feet.

The other curious thing I noted was that the more I departed from the philosophy endorsed by the atheist philosophical gurus of Infidels—mostly regarding scientific epistemology and meta-ethical subjective relativism—the worse their reasoning became and the more angry and contemptuous they became. I was the subject of the most vicious personal attack I've ever witnessed merely because I left the board.

I came to the conclusion that no one, atheist or religious, enjoys having his or her own views criticized, and, absent a structure of enforcement, will often early abandon reasoned discourse for invective and personal attack.

As a case in point (on the religious side), look at Stephen's comment on the feedback post. I am called a "relentless prick", a "pain-in-the-ass", "obnoxious", "like a self-absorbed bully", "splenetic and insecure", "attention-hunger[ing], swaggering, and bullying", arrogant, mean-spirited, pissy, needy of attention, outrageous, egotistical, angry, and hateful. In an earlier comment, Stephen calls me "a take no prisoners troll". Kenneth has called me "a petulant man-child", "insulting", a "victim", "a classic bully", "a petulant, arrogant, bully", one who "a sound defeat as a stunning victory" [a lie; I never claimed "victory"]. He further calls me "snippy", an "ass", "closed-minded", "a playground bully", one who "crap[s] on my plate and call[s] it chocolate pudding," one who indulges in "playground name-calling", "rigid and so enslaved". (He correctly identifies where I was unclear to his detriment; had he simply pointed out the error, I would have apologized and corrected it.) And these are just a sample.

Now, I'm not in the least bit offended by Stephen's or Kenneth's comments; they have a right to whatever opinion of me they please and I'm happy to let them slide off my back. But compare and contrast their comments with my own in our conversation, especially the post which apparently drew his ire. Search as you will—I've linked to most of the posts on his blog on which I've commented—and you will not find a single unkind word only one unkind word (I called him an "insensitive creep" for suggesting I would be blasé about a loved one being raped) I've said about the man himself, only my honest opinion about his ideas. The worst (unprovoked) thing I said about him was that he couldn't handle criticism and having his ideas mocked, which is factually true: I mocked his ideas here and he banned me from his blog. (The only person I've banned from The Barefoot Bum, Perezoso, was banned for harassment, not for disagreeing with me or posting a personal attacks.)

I was banned asked to part ways from Subversive Christianity because I accused Kerry of typical intellectual laziness... for a post in which was nothing but a thinly disguised accusation—without a shred of argumentation—that atheists were fascist jackbooted thugs. This is the same person who called Richard Dawkins a "halfwit" on the same intellectual level as Ravi Zacharias. Again, Kerry is entitled to his opinion. But there it is.

I had a falling out with a theist friend because I said that employing the fall of Man (i.e. original sin) as a component of theodicy was too risible to be worthy of discussion.

(Just to compare, the vicious personal attacks on Infidels stemmed from a particular personal attack ostensibly regarding my use of "evidential" instead of "evidentiary" (or was it the other way around?); I was contradicting the dominant anti-Popper philosophy of the Infidels philosophical gurus.)

There are, of course, two sides (at least!) to every story; I'm not trying to justify myself; I'm just trying to tell you where I'm coming from, from my own subjective perspective.

I've drawn two conclusions: First, the philosophical underpinnings of religion are not merely mistaken, they are ridiculous. They are nothing but post hoc rationalizations to support the objective truth of the speaker's moral self-righteousness. (I am, of course, just as self-righteous as any religious person, but I have what I see as the honesty and sincerity to own my self-righteousness as my opinion, however strongly held.)

The other conclusion is that once someone has become attached to any philosophical idea, they view any criticism of that idea as a personal attack and react defensively. Religious people tend to be more attached to more ideas which are more stupid and ridiculous, but the defensive reaction is not limited to theists.

I have an extremely passionate nature, and I'm becoming more passionate as I grow older. Were I not gifted with a degree of analytical skill and, perhaps more importantly, had I not received a pacifistic and liberal upbringing, I might well have become violent to some degree. But I do have analytical skill, and I was raised as a pacifist, and I'm not violent, not in the least. I'm not going to apologize or feel the slightest shred of guilt or shame for who I am; I'm ethically responsible only for the choices I make in how to express my nature.

I very passionately loathe stupidity, falsehood and error. I abhor human suffering and despise that which causes it. Half of all human suffering is caused just by people being mean and dumb, but a goodly portion is at least amplified, if not directly caused, by ideological stupidity. Religion doesn't have a monopoly on ideological stupidity—I oppose more-or-less secular American exceptionalism, and I would oppose Soviet-style Marxism were it still a live philosophy—but religion has been, in my opinion, the longest-established and biggest supplier of evil-causing bullshit.

I admit to rather more personal grievance against Islamic culture and religion. My wife is an apostate from Islam (and thus subject to the death penalty in any Islamic country), and the level of suffering she has endured at the hands of this culture and religion angers me to this day. Her experiences have prompted considerable research, and the more I read about Islam, the more I become angered by its medieval ethics, pervasive misogyny and violent response to the lightest criticism.

But other things really piss me off too. The millions of Iraqis killed—and tens of millions injured and made homeless—by our regime of sanctions and two wars. The destruction by the Republican party of what few Enlightenment gains made in my country over two hundred years, the enthusiastic Christianist support for this destruction, and the shameful complicity of the Democratic party in not opposing this destruction.

I don't believe that anything changes until people get really pissed off about it, until they stick their heads out the window and say, "I'm mad as hell, and I'm not going to take it anymore." The men in Islam are not going to treat their women better—and the women in Islam cannot fight for their ordinary human rights—until the weight of world's contempt exceeds the male privilege of that culture. As valuable as is dispassionate, abstract discourse, we're not going to stop wars of aggression, torture, and the destruction of our civil liberties with abstractions and bend-over-backwards politeness.

I do not attempt to disguise my contempt for stupidity, but I do my best to talk in detail about what I am contemptuous of and to justify and explain my contempt. I hope you will never see a simple pejorative without (excepting common knowledge) a detailed substantiation underneath it.

What you read here is me, good and bad. I write for myself only, and to an audience of one (my wife, with whom I do not always agree). Keep reading my blog, gentle reader, and I will contradict some dearly held idea of yours. If you defend your idea poorly, I will mock your defense; if your idea supports human suffering I will express my contempt. You have been warned.


[1] "Howard Beale", Network, 1976, Paddy Chayefsky. Happy, Jimi?

Sunday, June 24, 2007

Random Facts

The Archcrone has tagged me with the Random Facts Meme. The meme is:
  1. All right, here are the rules.
  2. We have to post these rules before we give you the facts.
  3. Players start with eight random facts/habits about themselves.
  4. People who are tagged need to write their own blog about their eight things and post these rules.
  5. At the end of your blog, you need to choose eight people to get tagged and list their names. Don’t forget to leave them a comment telling them they’re tagged, and to read your blog.

Here be the facts:
  1. I dropped out of both high-school and college
  2. I don't own a television
  3. I rarely listen to music, except incidentally.
  4. I used to brew my own beer (but I then realized I could buy it for $1.25 a bottle).
  5. I hate mayonnaise
  6. I worked as a computer programmer for almost ten years before I had a computer at home
  7. I have extremely wide and short hands and feet (EEEE-width) and stubby fingers and toes
  8. I wear mostly Hawaiian shirts

I'll tag:

My lovely wife
James
Janice
Chicken Girl
Plognark
Himself
Jonah
Norm
anticant
DBB
Kenneth

(Yes, I know I can't count.)

And anyone else who wants to participate.

Sunday, July 01, 2007

The last word

Kenneth has the last word.

Please do not comment on his blog, at least not in my defense or on my account; I don't want to incite spam or harassment. He's apparently a rather sensitive fellow. Feel free, of course, to comment on this post, pro or con.

[Update: my "meek" wife puts her two cents in.]

Wednesday, July 04, 2007

Atheism, reason and logic

D. R. Khashaba makes some interesting points about the theism/atheism conflict:
Faith as commonly understood is, in my view, a mockery of reason and an insult to human intelligence, and the usual attempts to reconcile faith and reason turn out to be no more than word jugglery or self-deception. But on the other hand, through mere reason we cannot find our way to any reality or any value. Kant had to support and supplement pure reason with practical reason. Kant's followers restored Reason to the Whole to rescue it from its sterile purity. Whitehead put reality and value back into the world by insisting on the integrity of experience. These were all insightful moves. To preserve our dignity and our worth as human beings, we must have unfettered Reason, but it must be Reason with a throbbing heart. I hold that the one way to achieve that object is to find all reality and all value within ourselves. The self-evidence of the reality and value within us is the Faith we need, is the God the believers craved and the unbelievers sacrificed. [emphasis added]
I definitely agree with the first highlighted passage—as attested to by everyone from amateurs such as Kenneth, organizations such as Mere Comments to professional philosophers and theologians such as Swinburne and Plantinga[1]—but I have to object to the second.

Substitute "logic" for "reason" and the second passage becomes uncontroversial: It seems clear that we do not live in a world that is purely logically necessary: There seem to be an infinity of "possible worlds", i.e. internally consistent descriptions of an hypothetical reality which are observably distinct from our own actual universe.

But I think Khashaba is off-base to condemn the entirety of current theism/atheism discussions as shallow, trivial and anemic, and he's pretentious to think that he himself is infusing any lifeblood into the debate. I suspect that he has restricted his reading to academic philosophy, which has very little currency in the real world. It is no surprise that three of the four best-selling atheist authors are scientists (Dawkins and Harris) or journalists (Hitchens). I love the fourth, philosopher Dan Dennett, and I want to have his baby, but he has not led the charge actually confronting the mockery of reason and the insult to human intelligence that is faith and religion. I don't think he has any obligation to do so, and his work is exemplary, but he's definitely not in front.

Most of the actual atheists who participate in the non-academic theism/atheism discourse come from a scientific background, not a philosophy background. And to anyone who understands and values the scientific method "insisting on the integrity of experience" is not Whitehead's idea, but Galileo's and Magellan's, with a five hundred year pedigree.

I will take Khashaba's word for it that the discussion in the academic philosophy community may be shallow, trivial and anemic. I'm not surprised: It took five hundred years for philosophers to even start thinking about science the way scientists think about it, and even Popper got so much wrong that he must be, like Freud, admired mostly for his pioneering spirit rather than his perspicacity.

But the discussion down in the trenches is deep, vigorous and even (in the purely rhetorical sense) somewhat bloody. This discussion isn't in academia, it's in the blogs, the message boards, and the popular press.

The notion that, outside of academia, more than a tiny minority of ordinary atheists advocate the "sterile purity of reason" (i.e. logical necessity) is risible. Such ordinary atheists are often professional scientists and engineers. Almost to a person, they value science and insist on the integrity of experience and the importance of human value. They are motivated not by the illogic of faith (an infinity of ideas can be made merely logical) but by moral and intellectual revulsion against religious bullshit.


[1] I'd mention another philosophy professor, but he's destroyed the evidence of his word jugglery and self-deception.

Tuesday, May 22, 2007

Top ten religious idiots #2

(Previous list)

(I'm tired of ranking everything. New items will appear at the top of the list.)

  1. The Government of Pakistan: Fellow ministers failed to support Nilofar Bakhtiar, Pakistan's Minister for Tourism (Pakistan has tourism?), when hard-line Islamic clerics demanded her resignation for hugging her parachute instructor at a charity event.
    (Izvestia; h/t to Fark; 22 May 07)

  2. 49 State Legislatures: Religious conservatives are lobbying nationwide against mandated HPV vaccine, claiming that it will "encourage promiscuity". Assuming arguendo that this claim is true, apparently such people consider promiscuity to be worse than death by cervical cancer. Only Virgina has mandated the administration of this life-saving vaccine.
    (e.g. StarNewsOnline.com; 22 May 07)

  3. Eva Marie Mauldin: Their infant daughter was severely burned after her husband, Joshua, placed her in a microwave for 10-20 seconds. The mother blames... Satan. Authorities are seeking to sever their parental rights.
    (Houston Chronicle; h/t to News of the Weird Daily; 21 May 07)

  4. Iraqi Yazidis and Muslims: "The stoning to death of a teenage girl belonging to the Yazidi religious sect because she fell in love with a Muslim man has led to a spiral of violence in northern Iraq in which 23 elderly factory workers have been shot dead and 800 Yazidi students forced to flee their university in Mosul."
    (The Independent; Thanks anticant!; 15 May 07)

  5. Rev. Sherman C. Gee Allen: Just being a clergyman accused of assault and rape is not enough to make it to the list (even given the blatant hypocrisy: clergy are held up as moral exemplars). However Rev. Allen had his own "spin" on sexual assault, justifying it with biblical verses: Plaintiff Davina Kelly said that Rev. Allen
    gave her a Bible and asked her to turn to passages such as the one that yielded the phrase "spare the rod, spoil the child."

    "It ended up being a lot of Scripture on spanking for the most part – parents disciplining their children," she said in a February interview. "When he had me read them, it became obvious he meant for it to be spanking me."
    Rev. Allen has denied the allegations.
    (dallasnews.com; h/t to Fark.com; 15 May 07)

  6. Eric Rudolph: Serving life in Colorado's "Supermax" prison for a series of religiously-motivated abortion clinic bombings and the murder of a police officer, Rudolph is still able to taunt his victims thanks to the cooperation of an Army of God supporter.
    (Tulsa World; h/t to Fark.com; 15 May 07)

  7. Fred Phelps: Phelps' Westboro Baptist Church will be picketing Jerry Falwell's funeral.
    (Westboro Baptist Church [pdf]; h/t to Fark; 17 May 07)

  8. Dick and Luke Otterstad: This father and son team is picketing San Juan High School principal Dave Terwilliger. Their agenda: To permit Christian students to wear anti-gay t-shirts to school. The principal had previously suspended students for wearing t-shirts implying that homosexuals would go to hell. [see comments]
    (Sacramento Bee; h/t to Atheist Revolution; 19 May 07)

  9. Straitgate Church proselytizers: Several members of the Church were mistaken (?) for child molesters for approaching children in a Minneapolis public park.
    (StarTribune.com; h/t to Fark; 19 May 07)

  10. The National Association of State Boards of Education: The only candidate for president of this august institution is Kenneth Willard, a Kansas Republican who supports the teaching of Biblical creationism, er... scientific creationism, oops... intelligent design in public schools.
    (statesman.com; h/t to Fark; 19 May 07)

Statistics:
This list: Religion 10, Nontheism 0
Previous list: Religion 10, Nontheism 0
Total: Religion 20, Nontheism 0

Saturday, July 03, 2010

James K. Galbraith explains it all

James K. Galbraith explains liberal democratic capitalist macroeconomics in 4473 words. His testimony, which I've reproduced in full, is in the public domain.

Commentary will follow in the next post.

(via Rdan)

Statement to the Commission on Deficit Reduction
James K. Galbraith, Lloyd M. Bentsen, jr., Chair in Government/Business
Relations, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin
June 30, 2010

Mr. Chairmen, members of the commission, thank you for inviting this statement.

I am a professional economist, but I have served in a political role, as Executive Director of the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress. I am offering this statement on behalf of Americans for Democratic Action, an organization co-founded in 1949 by (among others) Eleanor Roosevelt, John Kenneth Galbraith, Arthur M. Schlesinger, jr., and Ronald Reagan. Accordingly I would like to begin with a political comment.

1. Clouds Over the Work of the Commission.

Your proceedings are clouded by illegitimacy. In this respect, there are four major issues.

First, most of your meetings are secret, apart from two open sessions before this one, which were plainly for show. There is no justification for secret meetings on deficit reduction. No secrets of any kind are involved. Nothing you say will affect financial markets. Congress long ago -- in 1975 -- reformed its procedures to hold far more sensitive and complicated meetings, notably legislative markups, in the broad light of day.

Secrecy breeds suspicion: first, that your discussions are at a level of discourse so low that you feel it would be embarrassing to disclose them. Second, that some members of the commission are proceeding from fixed, predetermined agendas. Third, that the purpose of the secrecy is to defer public discussion of cuts in Social Security and Medicare until after the 2010 elections. You could easily dispel these suspicions by publishing video transcripts of all of your meetings on the Internet, and by holding all future meetings in public. Please do so.

Second, there is a question of leadership. A bipartisan commission should approach its task in a judicious, open-minded and dispassionate way. For this, the attitude and temperament of the leadership are critical.

I first met Senator Simpson when we were both on Capitol Hill; at Harvard he became friends with my late parents. He is admirably frank in his views. But Senator Simpson has plainly shown that he lacks the temperament to do a fair and impartial job on this commission. This is very clear from the abusive response he made recently to Alex Lawson of Social Security Works, who was asking important questions about the substance of the commission's work, as well as calling attention to the illegitimate secrecy under which you are operating.

A general cannot speak of the President with contempt. Likewise the leader of a commission intended to sway the public cannot display contempt for the public. With due respect, Senator Simpson's conduct fails that test.

Third, most members of the Commission are political leaders, not economists. With all respect for Alice Rivlin, with just one economist on board you are denied access to the professional arguments surrounding this highly controversial issue. In general, it is impossible to have a fair discussion of any important question when the professional participants in that discussion have been picked, in advance, to represent a single point of view.

Conflicts of interest constitute the fourth major problem. The fact that the Commission has accepted support from Peter G. Peterson, a man who has for decades conducted a relentless campaign to cut Social Security and Medicare, raises the most serious questions. Quite apart from the merits of Mr. Peterson's arguments, this act must be condemned. A Commission serving public purpose cannot accept funds or other help from a private party with a strong interest in the outcome of that Commission's work. Your having done so is a disgrace.

In my view you also should not have accepted help from the Economic Policy Institute, even though EPI's positions on the merits are substantially closer to mine.

Let me now turn to the economic questions. A first economic question is, what caused the deficits and rising public debt? The answer comes in two parts: present deficits and projected future deficits.

2. Current Deficits and Rising Debt were Caused by the Financial Crisis.

Overwhelmingly, the present deficits are caused by the financial crisis. The financial crisis, the fall in asset (especially housing) values, and withdrawal of bank lending to business and households has meant a sharp decline in economic activity, and therefore a sharp decrease in tax revenues and an increase in automatic payments for unemployment insurance and the like. According to a new IMF staff analysis, fully half of the large increase in budget deficits in major economies around the world is due to collapsing tax revenues, and a further large share to low (often negative) growth in relation to interest payments on existing debt. Less than ten percent is due to increased discretionary public expenditure, as in stimulus packages.

This point is important because it shows that the claim that deficits have resulted from "overspending" is false, both in the United States and abroad.

3. Future Deficit Projections are Generally Based on Forecasts which Begin by Assuming Full Recovery, but this Assumption is Highly Unrealistic.

Unlike the present deficits, expected future deficits are not usually considered to be due to continued recession and high unemployment. To understand how the discussion of future deficits is being framed, it is necessary to grasp the work of the principal forecasting authority, the Congressional Budget Office. CBO's projections proceed in two steps. First, they wipe out the current deficits, over a very short time horizon, by assuming a full economic recovery. Second, they create an entirely new source of future deficits, essentially out of whole cloth. The critical near-term assumption in the CBO baseline concerns employment. CBO claims to expect a relatively rapid return, over five years, to high levels of employment, and the baseline incorporates a correspondingly high rate of real growth in the early recovery from the great crisis. If this were to happen, then tax revenues would recover, and ordinarily the projected deficits would disappear. This is what did happen under full employment in the late 1990s.

But under present financial conditions this scenario of a rapid return to high employment is highly unrealistic. It can only happen if the credit system finances economic growth, which implies a rising level of private (household and company) debt relative to GDP. And that clearly is not going to happen. On the contrary, de-leveraging in the private sector is sure to remain the rule for a long time, as mortgages and other debts default or are paid down, and as many households remain effectively insolvent due to their mortgage debt.

With high unemployment, high public deficits are inevitable. The only choice is between an active deficit, incurred by putting people to work or otherwise serving national needs -- such as providing a decent retirement and health care to the aged -- and a passive deficit, incurred because at high unemployment tax revenues necessarily fail to cover public spending. Cutting public spending or raising taxes, now or in the future, by any amount, cannot reduce a deficit due to high unemployment. The only fiscal effect is to convert an active deficit into a passive one -- with disastrous economic and social effects.

4. Having Cured the Deficits with an Unrealistic Forecast, CBO Recreates them with Another, Very Different, but Equally Unrealistic Forecast.

In the CBO models, high future deficits and rising debt relative to GDP are expected. But the source is not a weak economy. It is a set of assumptions describing an economy after full recovery from the present crisis. In the CBO forecasts, big future deficits arise from a combination of (a) rapidly rising health care costs and (b) rising short-term interest rates, in the context of (c) a rapid return to high employment and (d) continued low overall inflation. This combination produces, mechanically, a very large net interest payout and a rapidly rising public debt in relation to a slowly rising nominal GDP.

Even if CBO were right about recovery, which it is not, this projection is internally inconsistent and wholly implausible. It isn't going to happen. Low overall inflation (at two percent) is inconsistent with the projected rise of short-term interest rates to nearly five percent. Why would the central bank carry out such a policy when no threat of inflation justifies it? But the assumed rise in interest rates drives the projected debt-to-GDP dynamic.

Similarly, the rise in projected interest payments is inconsistent with low nominal inflation. Interest payments rising to over 20 percent of GDP by mid-century would constitute new federal spending similar in scale to the mobilization for World War II. Obviously this cannot happen with two percent inflation. And although a higher inflation rate is undesirable, arithmetically it means a lower debt-to-GDP ratio.

Finally, rapidly rising health care costs and low overall inflation are mutually consistent only if all prices except health care are rising at less than that low overall inflation rate -- including energy and food prices in a time of increasing scarcity. This too is extremely unlikely. Either overall health care costs will decelerate (relieving the so-called Medicare funding problem) or the overall inflation rate will accelerate -- reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio.

In sum: the economic forecasts on which you are being asked to develop a credible plan for reducing deficits over the medium term are a mess. The unemployment and growth forecasts are implausibly optimistic, while the inflation and interest rates projections are implausibly pessimistic and mutually inconsistent.

Good policy cannot be based on bad forecasts. As a first step in your work -- long overdue -- the Commission should require the development of internally consistent, and factually plausible, economic forecasts on which to base future deficit and debt projections.

5. The Only Way to Reduce Public Deficits is to Restore Private Credit.

The conclusion to draw from the above argument is that large deficits going forward are likely to have the same source as they do right now: stubbornly high unemployment.

The only way to reduce a deficit caused by unemployment is to reduce unemployment. And this must be done with a substantial component of private financing, which is to say by bank credit, if the public deficit is going to be reduced. This is a fact of accounting. It is not a matter of theory or ideology; it is merely a fact. The only way to grow out of our deficit is to cure the financial crisis.

To cure the financial crisis would require two comprehensive measures. The first is debt restructuring for the entire household sector, to restore private borrowing power. The second is a reconstruction of the banking system, effectively purging the toxic assets from bank balance sheets and also reforming the bank personnel and compensation and other practices that produced the financial crisis in the first place. To repeat: this is the only way to generate deficit-reducing, privately-funded growth and employment.

As a former top adviser in the Clinton White House, co-chairman Bowles no doubt knows that privately-funded economic growth produced the boom years of the late 1990s and the associated surplus in the federal budget. He must also know that the practices of banks and investment banks with which they were closely associated worked to destroy the financial system a decade later. But I would wager that the Commission has spent no time, so far, on a discussion of the relationship between deficit reduction and financial reform.

To be clear: unemployment can be cured without private-sector financing, if public deficits are large enough -- as was done during World War II. But if the objective is to reduce public deficits, for whatever reason, then a large contribution from private credit is essential.

One more time: without private credit, deficit reduction plans through fiscal austerity, now or in the future, will fail. They cannot succeed. If at the time the cuts take effect the economy is still relying on public expenditure to fund economic activity, then reducing expenditure (or increasing taxes) will simply reduce GDP and the deficits will not go away.

Further, if the finances of the private sector could be fixed, then an austerity program would be entirely unnecessary to reduce public debt. The entire national experience from 1946 to 1980, when public debt fell from 121 to about 33 percent of GDP and again from 1994 to 2000, proves this. In those years the debt-to-GDP ratio fell mainly because of creditdriven economic growth -- certainly not because of public-sector austerity programs. And this is why the deficits returned, in 1980-2 and in 2000, once the credit markets froze up and the private economy entered recession.

Thus until the private financial sector is fully reformed -- or supplemented by parallel financing institutions as was done in the New Deal -- high deficits and a high public-debt-to-GDP ratio are inevitable. In the limit, if there is no private financial recovery, debt-to-GDP will converge to some steady-state value, probably near 100 percent - a normal number in some countries - and at that point the public deficit will be the sole engine of new economic growth going forward. Only when the private sector steps up, will the debt-to-GDP ratio begin to decline.

For this reason, a Commission report focused on "entitlement reform" rather than "financial reform" would be entirely beside the point. Entitlement cuts, no matter how severe, cannot and will not achieve deficit reduction. They cannot "meaningfully improve the long-term fiscal outlook," as required by your charter. All they will accomplish is to impoverish vulnerable Americans, impairing the functioning of the private economy and the taxing capacity of the government.

6. Social Security and Medicare "Solvency" is not part of the Commission's Mandate.

I note from Chairman Simpson's conversation with Alex Lawson that the Commission has taken up the questions of the alleged "insolvency" of the Social Security system and of Medicare. If true, this is far outside any mandate of the Commission. Your mandate is strictly limited to matters relating to the deficit, debt-to-GDP ratio and fiscal stability of the U.S. Government as a whole. Social Security and Medicare are part of the government as a whole, so it is within your mandate to discuss those programs -- but only in that context.

To make recommendations about the matching of benefits to payroll taxes -- now or in the future -- would be totally inappropriate. Within your mandate, the levels of payroll taxes and of Social Security benefits are relevant only insofar as they influence the current and future fiscal position of the government as a whole. Their relationship to each other is not relevant. You are not a "Social Security Commission" and there is no provision in your Charter for a separate discussion of the alleged financial condition of either program taken on its own. Such discussions, if they are occurring, should be subjected to a point of order.

The usual "solvency" arguments directed at the Social Security system and at Medicare as separate entities are in any event complete nonsense. These programs are just programs, like any others, in the Federal Budget, and the Social Security and Medicare "systems" are thus fully solvent so long as the Federal Government is. Further, as explained below, under our monetary arrangements there is no "solvency" issue for the federal government as a whole. The federal government is "solvent" so long as U.S. banks are required to accept US. Government checks -- which is to say so long as there is a Federal authority in the Republic. This point has been demonstrated repeatedly in times of stress, notably during the Civil War and World War II.

7. As a Transfer Program, Social Security is Also Irrelevant to Deficit Economics.

Political discussions of "long-term fiscal sustainability" -- including in the Charter for this Commission -- make an economic error when they loosely use the word "entitlements" and suggest that supposed economic dangers of federal deficits (for instance, rising real interest rates) can be reduced by "entitlement reform." As a matter of economics, this is not true.

"Government Spending" -- as any textbook will verify -- is a component of GDP only insofar as the spending is directly on purchases of goods and services. That alone is what economists mean by the phrase "government spending." GDP is the final consumption of produced goods and services, and government is one of the major consuming sectors; the others being private business (investment) and households (consumption).

Social Security is a transfer program. It is not a spending program. A dollar "spent" on Social Security does not directly increase GDP. It merely reallocates a dollar from one potential final consumer (a taxpayer) to another (a retiree, a disabled person or a survivor). It also reallocates resources within both communities (taxpayers and beneficiaries). Specifically, benefits flow to the elderly and to survivors who do not have families that might otherwise support them, and costs are imposed on working people and other taxpayers who do not have dependents in their own families. Both types of transfer are fair and effective, greatly increasing security and reducing poverty -- which is why Social Security and Medicare are such successful programs.

Transfers of this kind are also indefinitely sustainable -- in fact there can intrinsically be no problem of sustainability with transfer programs. Apart from their effect on individual security, a true transfer program uses (by definition) no net economic resources. The only potential macroeconomic danger from "excessive" transfers is that the transfer function may be badly managed, leading to excessive total demand and to inflation. But there is no risk of this so long as the financial crisis remains uncured. Under present conditions Social Security and Medicare are bulwarks for stabilizing a total demand that would otherwise be highly deficient.

Similarly, cutting Social Security benefits, in particular, merely transfers real resources away from the elderly and toward taxpayers, and away from the poor toward those less poor. One can favor or oppose such a move on its own merits as social policy - but one cannot argue that it would save real resources that are otherwise being "consumed" by the government sector.

The conclusion to be drawn is that Social Security should in any event be off the agenda of your Commission, as it is a transfer program and not a program of public spending in the economic sense. In particular it does not use capital resources and will not drive up interest rates. This is true whether the "Social Security System" is in internal balance or not.

8. Markets are not calling for Deficit Reduction; Now or Later.

Let me turn next to a larger economic question. Do deficit projections matter? Are they important? Was the President well-advised to frame the mandate of the Commission as he did?

What, in short, are the economic consequences of a high public deficit and a rising debt-to-GDP ratio, and what (if any) benefits are to be expected from creating an expectation that deficits will come down and that the debt-to-GDP ratio will fall?

The idea that US economic policy should aim for a path of reduced deficits in the future, is shared by liberals and conservatives, and it is, from a political standpoint, a very powerful idea. The Commission's charter takes for granted that this goal is desirable. It specifies that your objective is to achieve a balanced "primary budget" -- net of interest payments, by 2015.

Yet your charter does say why this is an appropriate goal. It cites no study to which one might refer. It does not explain why 2015 is the right target date, as opposed to (say) 2025 or even 2050. It does not spell out the economic consequences -- if any -- of failing to meet the stated objective.

Does the requirement make economic sense? I shall tackle that question in two parts. The first accepts the view most people hold of the fiscal and financial world. The second reflects, from an operational standpoint, how that world actually works in practice.

Most informed laymen believe that the Federal government must borrow in order to spend. They believe that the interest rate on Treasury securities is set in a market for government bonds. The markets impose discipline on the government. Thus their idea is that "fiscal responsibility" will produce low long-term interest rates and tolerable borrowing conditions for the federal government, while "irresponsibility" will be punished by higher, and eventually intolerable, debt service costs.

Accepting this view for the moment, what does the present level of long-term interest rates tell us? As I write, thirty year Treasury bonds are yielding just over four percent -- or just a little more than half their yield a decade back. On the argument just given, this must be an extraordinary success of virtuous policy. It seems that Wall Street has made a strong vote of confidence in the fiscal probity of our current policies. This vote is unqualified, backed by money, contingent on nothing. It therefore represents a categorical rejection, by Wall Street itself, of the CBO's doomsday scenarios and all other deficit-scare stories.

On this theory, it follows that the mandate to reduce the primary deficit to zero by 2015 is unnecessary. Such an action can hardly reduce interest rates -- neither short nor long-term -- which are already historically low.

But wait a minute, some may say. Yes interest rates are low at the moment. But bond markets are fickle, they can turn on a dime. And what then?

Yes, it is possible that interest rates could rise. But the problem with this argument is that it takes us away from the premise of rationality. If bond markets are fickle and arbitrary, who is to say what they will do in response to any particular policy? In the face of irrational markets, the sensible policy is to borrow heavily for so long as they are offering a good deal. One may say that all good things end, and perhaps they will. But if markets are irrational, then by construction you cannot prevent this by "good behavior."

The conclusion from this section is that one cannot logically argue that markets insist on deficit reduction. Either the markets are rationally unworried about deficits, or they are acting irrationally right now, in which case they can hardly "insist" on anything.

9. In Reality, the US Government Spends First & Borrows Later; Public Spending Creates a Demand for Treasuries in the Private Sector.

As noted, the above argument is based on the common belief that the government must borrow in order to spend, and thus that the government faces "funding risks" in private markets. Such risks exist, of course, for private individuals, for companies, for state and local governments, and for national governments such as Greece that have ceded monetary sovereignty to a central bank. But the situation of the United States government is quite different.

The U.S. government spends (and the Federal Reserve lends) in a very simple way. It does so by writing checks -- in fact simply by marking up numbers in a computer. Those numbers then appear in the bank accounts of the payees, who may be government employees, private contractors, or the recipients of federal transfer programs.

The effect of government check-writing is to create a deposit in the banking system. This is a "free reserve." Banks of course prefer to earn interest on their reserves. Thus they demand a US Treasury bond, which pays more interest without incurring any form of credit or default risk. (This is like moving a deposit from a checking to a savings account.) The Treasury can meet that demand, or not, at its option -- it can permit, or not permit, the stock of US Treasury bonds in circulation to increase.

So long as U.S. banks are required to accept U.S. government checks -- which is to say so long as the Republic exists -- then the government can and does spend without borrowing, if it chooses to do so. And if it chooses to issue Treasuries to meet the demand, it can do that as well. There is never a shortfall of demand for Treasury bonds; Treasury auctions do not fail.

In the real world, the government creates demand for bonds by spending above the level drained by taxation from the system. The extent to which those bonds are held locally, or abroad (another common source of worry) depends on the US current account deficit. This also has nothing to do with approval or disapproval by foreign bankers, central bankers, or their governments of American deficit policy. A foreign country cannot acquire a US Treasury bond unless someone outside the United States has acquired dollars to pay for them, which is generally done by running a trade surplus with the United States. And when foreigners do acquire those dollars, then like domestic banks they prefer to earn interest, which is why they buy Treasury bonds.

Insolvency, bankruptcy, or even higher real interest rates are not among the actual risks to this system. The actual risks in this system are (to a minor degree) inflation, and to a larger degree, depreciation of the dollar. However at the moment there is wide agreement that a lower dollar would be a good thing -- against the Chinese RMB and now also the euro. So it is difficult to believe that the goal of deficit reduction per se serves any coherent, or presently desirable, economic objective.

We can conclude that there is actually no economic justification for the target of reducing the primary deficit to zero by 2015 or any other date. The right economic objectives are to meet real problems, not those conjured from thin air by economists. Bringing about a rapid end to unemployment, caring properly for an aging population, cleaning up the Gulf of Mexico, coping with our energy insecurity and with climate change are all far more important objectives than reducing a projection of future budget deficits.

10. The Best Place in History (for this Commission) Would be No Place At All.

Most people assume that "bipartisan commissions" are designed to fail: they are given thorny (or even impossible) issues and told to make recommendations which Congress is free to ignore or reject. In many cases -- yours is no exception -- the goal is to defer recognition of the difficulties for as long as possible.

You are plainly not equipped by disposition or resources to take on the true cause of deficits now and in the future: the financial crisis. Recommendations based on CBO's unrealistic budget and economic outlooks are destined to collapse in failure. Specifically, if cuts are proposed and enacted in Social Security and Medicare, they will hurt millions, weaken the economy, and the deficits will not decline. It's a lose-lose proposition, with no gainers except a few predatory funds, insurance companies and such who would profit, for some time, from a chaotic private marketplace.

Thus the interesting twist in your situation is that the Republic would be better served by advancing no proposals at all.

Thursday, August 12, 2010

The Stupid! It Burns! (Catholic edition)


The Godless Delusion
: (Judging from the author's review, The Godless Delusion: A Catholic Challenge to Modern Atheism by Patrick Madrid and Kenneth Hensley seems itself a burningly stupid book.)
...really many atheists are seriously looking for truth and the atheist worldview is downright depressing... Many atheists probably fall in the same camp in that they never take seriously that their can be a rational argument for God. No doubt there are atheists who live a tension with God in that they are really defying God more than not believing in him or do not want to look at the case for God because they realize they would have to change. ...

The third chapter starts of the real meat of this book as it looks at morality and the fact that materialism can’t explain it. ...

Later on they go into area of epistemology and how materialism is unable to provide a serious explanation for knowledge and reason. Kind of like the joke where the scientist creates life out of dirt and God tells him to create his own dirt.

Sunday, June 17, 2007

Epistemology and truth

Update: This post relates to my conversation with Kenneth at Time Immortal. He's responded to this essay as well.

The primary job of an epistemic system obviously is to find the truth.

"Obvious" and similar phrases—especially in philosophy—are big red flags that all too often mean, "Here's where I start bullshitting you." By qualifying a point as "obvious", the writer usually avoids substantiating the point. But if the point were truly obvious, why mention it at all? "Obvious" doesn't always mark bullshit, but it does so often enough that you should automatically view any point so qualified with extreme suspicion.

An enormous part of philosophical investigations of evidentiary epistemology, the connection between our perceptions and "truth" about reality, does not at all discuss whether our perceptions are related to truth about the world, but rather on establishing the lack of deductive rigor in the process itself, and how we should think about this lack. All of these principles, Hume's critique of induction, Putnam's Twin Earth paradoxes, Gettier problems, Probabilism, etc. all talk about the rigor of evidentiary epistemology, not about whether it even begins to talk about the real truth.

The classical Greek Skeptics denied all knowledge, and no philosopher has ever successfully challenged their view. Descartes made a valiant effort, but never got past Cogito, which even the most dedicated solipsist accepts.

Even if we have a completely rigorous epistemic method, such as mathematical deduction, how do we tell if our valid conclusions are actually true? If I put two rocks in a bowl, and then two more, I "know" I'll count four rocks in the bowl. Do I know this because 2+2=4 is a valid theorem of arithmetic? Or do I know that integer arithmetic is a good model of my experience about rocks by some other means? If I put two drops of water in a bowl, and then two more, I "know" I won't count four drops of water.

I don't want to put down philosophy that investigates the rigor of epistemic systems. But I want to make crystal clear that this sort of philosophy asks the question: Assuming our epistemology is doing the job of establishing truth, how well does it do that job? But we're simply assuming that our epistemology does the job we're asking of it.

When we ask whether (rather than how rigorously) our epistemology is finding the truth, we run into a vicious circularity. To determine whether our epistemology is finding the truth, we must know the truth independently of that system. But by definition we need some sort of epistemic system to know the truth.

Theism doesn't really help. Simply by defining "truth" in some God-dependent manner doesn't free us from assuming that our epistemic systems deliver the truth, it just dresses up the assumptions in rococo finery hoping to dazzle us with shininess. At worst, theism just places the assumption in the realm of religious dogma, guarded from doubt and philosophical investigation by threat of Hell.

As Plantinga's evolutionary critique of naturalism shows, if we define "naturalism" in the broadest sense as an epistemology dependent on human reason and perception, and if we define "truth" to be something supernatural in this sense, then we need a supernatural entity to relate supernatural truth to natural knowledge.[1] It's a valid argument but obviously begs the question.[2]

It's clear that we cannot ask whether an epistemology delivers the truth. Rather, we are forced to define "truth" in terms of what an epistemology delivers (a subtle and complicated enough task when our epistemology is not absolutely rigorous).

Much of what passes for "postmodernist" philosophy recognizes this fundamental inversion of the "modernist" relationship between epistemology and truth. If "truth" is whatever an epistemology delivers, then anything can serve as an epistemology; there is no basis in truth for privileging one epistemology over another. But no basis in truth does not—as many postmodernist philosophers assert—mean no basis at all. Even if it makes no sense to ask whether an epistemology delivers the truth, there are other jobs we can ask our epistemology to do, other ways of separating epistemology from bullshit.


[1] Plantinga fundamentally argues against metaphysical naturalism. He still assumes that epistemological naturalism does deliver truth.

[2] I'm convinced that 99% (if not 99% or possibly even 100%) of skill in philosophy consists not of constructing sound arguments but of hiding the fundamental fallacy of begging the question by various means, notably equivocation, enthymemes, hand-waving, and bold assertion.

Tuesday, July 24, 2007

Postmodernism and epistemic nihilism

Ophelia Benson and Jeremy Stangroom attribute the flaws of postmodernism to juvenile contrarianism. One of the key concepts that I read from this article is the notion of epistemology relative to ethics: If one supports an ethical principle, then an epistemology is "valid" if it supports that ethical principle.
Louise Lamphere, for example, a past president of the American Anthropological Association, claims that there is an “urgent need” for an “engaged anthropology,” within which moral commitment trumps impersonal scientific concern, and where the communities that anthropologists work with are treated as equal partners in the research process.
I submit that this tendency should not be labeled as just "relativism", but rather as epistemological nihilism: If you're committed a priori to believing some proposition, ethical or otherwise, adding post hoc epistemic support for the proposition itself is pointless.

This anti-epistemology is subtly but fundamentally different from the scientific method. Although the scientific method attempts to construct logical accounts for perceptual evidence, the task is not to justify the perceptual evidence, it is to justify the logical account. Furthermore, the foundation of the scientific method, perceptual evidence, is just that evidence which is in fact accepted by everyone. The postmodernist anti-epistemology acts in the opposite way: A post hoc pseudo-epistemology exists only to justify the ethical beliefs in question, "proving" that we "know" these beliefs are "true"—or at least "true for us".

Actually, these sorts of postmodernists don't even bother with an actual epistemic method at all; they merely denounce any method that doesn't result in justifying whatever ethical belief is at issue as "fascist": As Benson and Stangroom quote Holmes, et al.
[T]he objective of this paper is to demonstrate that the evidence-based movement in the health sciences is outrageously exclusionary and dangerously normative with regards to scientific knowledge. As such, we assert that the evidence-based movement in health sciences constitutes a good example of microfascism at play in the contemporary scientific arena.
justified by Pearson by the
notion that no one view, theory or understanding should be privileged over another (or that no discourse should be silenced).
Calling some mode of discourse "microfascism" seems clearly—at least in postmodern terms—a hypocritical attempt to silence that discourse.

The characterization of evidence-basis as "microfascist" seems especially telling. If it is indeed the case that the sine qua non of any epistemic system is to generate principled agreement, then any epistemic system will be "fascist": The whole point of principled agreement is that by accepting the principles, one is inexorably "forced" to agree (in the same sense that one is inexorably forced to accelerate towards the Earth at ~10 m/s²). To denounce an epistemic system because it is principled, and therefore "fascist", is to deny epistemology and endorse epistemic nihilism.

It's interesting to compare and contrast the "leftist" postmodernism that Benson and Stangroom critique with the religious approach to epistemology. From Andrew Sullivan's debate with Sam Harris: He asserts that Harris has "allowed for the validity of religious faith as a form of legitimate truth-seeking in a different mode," as if that were a good thing. Couple this with Sullivan's deprecation of religious fundamentalism as unable to "to integrate doubt into faith" and you have exactly the same sort of "leftist" postmodernism from a Christian conservative: Religious faith is a different form of "truth-seeking" which results in truths that are different for everyone.

At least people such as Kenneth are a little more politically sound: He at least tries to establish some sort of method which substantiates a universal ethical stance, instead of embracing Sullivan's ethical relativism.

The really stupid part of the "leftist" postmodernism is that it's utterly unnecessary. Evidence-based science has no primary ethical content at all. Science tells us only what is, not which is the "better" of realistic alternatives. At best, science gives us only secondary ethical content: How best (or better) achieve a preferred result. Even if one wishes, as Benson and Stangroom attribute to Marglin, to "problemati[ze] the binary opposition that Western medicine invokes—not unreasonably, one might think—between disease and health, death and life," and contrast it "unfavourably with the traditional Indian worship of Sitala, the goddess of smallpox," one does not need to discuss epistemology—at least not scientific epistemology—at all. Science merely tells us that smallpox is caused by a particular bacillus virus; science does not at all tell us whether smallpox is good or bad.

Furthermore, as Benson and Stangroom point out, Marglin's goal is not to discuss the primary ethical value of smallpox itself, but rather to undermine the scientific description of smallpox as caused by a bacillus virus, "to challenge science’s claim to be a superior form of knowledge which renders obsolete more traditional systems of thought." It's just as "true", Marglin would seem to assert, that smallpox is some sort of divine punishment as it is that smallpox is the result of infection by a mindless bacillus virus.

I'm a postmodernist myself: I strongly disagree with the fundamental program of Modernism that primary ethics—what is "intrinsically" good and bad—is a matter of objective truth: Nothing is intrinsically good or bad; good and bad are fundamentally subjective evaluations. Infection by smallpox is bad because it causes people to suffer; infection by E-coli bacteria in our intestines is good because it causes people to feel good. Objectively, both are infestations of foreign organisms, with little to differentiate the two.

But I think a commitment to scientific truth—always descriptive, never primarily normative—is critical to the fundamental postmodernist program, because, whatever your primary ethical beliefs, science will always tell you how to achieve them.

Furthermore, to the extent that one values social cooperation, this goal is not achieved by blanket tolerance and epistemic nihilism. Blanket tolerance must tolerate ethically intolerance: If all value systems are equally true, then the ethically (and not just descriptively) totalitarian and "fascist" value systems of Islam and extremist Christianity are equally true, and their intolerance must be tolerated. To actually cooperate we must have two things: Agreement about the arena—objective reality—in which we must cooperate, and some basis for coming to ethical compromise, which entails a degree of tolerance and a degree of intolerance.

The only alternative is pure separatism: If we can't agree on how reality is, if we cannot construct ethical compromises, we have no choice but to live separately. But separatism is impossible: We cannot construct ideological or physical walls strong enough to resist human will. Even ignoring the ethical dimensions of genocide, as has been proven time and again, it is impossible in practice to physically exterminate even a tiny subset of those who disagree. We must learn to cooperate, and this is not a normative "must", but a scientific "must": If the human species survives at all, those who do learn to cooperate will eventually dominate those who do not or cannot cooperate.

Friday, June 29, 2007

Bannination!

[Update: Kenneth has lifted the ban. I do not anticipate returning to his blog anytime soon, however. (2 Jul 07)]

Yet another theist can't handle having his views contradicted and his intellectual failings mocked, and I've racked up my fourth blog ban! Quoth Jefferson:
Ridicule is the only weapon which can be used against unintelligible propositions. Ideas must be distinct before reason can act upon them; and no man ever had a distinct idea of the trinity. It is the mere Abracadabra of the mountebanks calling themselves the priests of Jesus.
Just so y'all know: I like pissing theists off.
  1. Mere Comments
  2. Subversive Christianity (now defunct; asked to "go our separate ways")
  3. Some dumbass who demanded I respect the "rationality" of her belief in Intelligent Design
  4. Time Immortal (ban lifted 2 Jul 07!)

And Stephen: Thanks for reading the blog!